Bivash Nayak
26 Jul
26Jul

Published on: Julyβ€―26,β€―2025

By: CyberDudeBivash Editorial Team

Website:cyberdudebivash.com


πŸ” Incident Summary

On Julyβ€―20, 2025, attackers hijacked Toptal’s GitHub organizationβ€”exposing 73 private repositories and injecting malicious code into their Picasso design system. They published ten trojanized npm packages under Toptal’s scope, downloaded approximately 5,000 times, delivering malware that exfiltrated GitHub authentication tokens and attempted to wipe victims’ systems.(turn0search3, turn0search1)


🧠 Attack Mechanics

StageTechnique UsedImpact
GitHub breachAttacker published altered Picasso code and pushed to npm registryExposed private code, deployed malware
Token theftpreinstall script runs gh auth token via CLI and sends to attacker endpointGrants attacker GitHub access
System wipepostinstall script executes sudo rm -rf --no-preserve-root / (Linux), or silent deletes on WindowsDevastate developer systems


The malicious packages included:


πŸ’₯ Why This Matters

  • Supply Chain Breakdown: Compromise from within a trusted GitHub account bypasses staging pipelines entirely.
  • Developer Impact: Developers installing affected Picasso modules during code builds risk local and CI system compromise.
  • Dual-threat Payload: Theft of GitHub tokens enables attacker lateral movement; the destructive wipe tool acts as a failsafe.

βœ… Action Plan for Developers & Teams

  1. Remove compromised packagesimmediately:
    npm uninstall @toptal/picasso-*
  1. or revert to prior safe versions if using pinned tags.(turn0search3)
  2. Rotate GitHub tokens and enforce token revocation across compromised environments.
  3. Audit package.json scriptsβ€”especially preinstall and postinstall hooksβ€”for unauthorized lifecycle commands.
  4. Check CI/CD logs and build agents for installations of the affected versions during July 20–23, 2025.
  5. Enable and review 2FA for GitHub and npm publishing accounts; enable SSO or identity controls.
  6. Adopt supply chain security tools: scan for rogue lifecycles, package provenance, and known IoCs in package-lock.json.
  7. Isolate developer environments where possibleβ€”consider running untrusted npm installs within secure containers or sandboxed environments.

🧠 Expert Insight

β€œThis breach is a continuing reminder that developer tools themselves can become provenance chains for ransomware-level destruction,” says Socket security researchers. The incident was swiftly remediated: Toptal deprecated the malicious packages by Julyβ€―23 and rolled back to safe versions.(turn0search3, turn0search16)


🧩 Key Takeaways

  • The breach underscores how developer trust boundaries can be weaponized via supply chain attacks.
  • Lifecycle scripts (preinstall, postinstall) remain a major blindspot, capable of both credential theft and destructive operations.
  • Supply chain defense requires continuous audit of dependencies, CI pipeline monitoring, runtime scanning, and account hardening.

πŸ—£οΈ Join the Conversation

  • Is your organization using Toptal’s Picasso npm packages?
  • Have you encountered suspicious lifecycle scripts or unexpected GitHub token activity?

Share your strategies and observations in the comments or tweet us at @CyberDudeBivash.


πŸ”— Stay Alert with CyberDudeBivash

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Tags: #ToptalBreach #npmSupplyChainAttack #PicassoPackages #TokenTheft #SystemWipe #DeveloperSecurity #GitHubCompromise #CyberDudeBivash

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