Flowise AI Platform: Remote Code Execution (RCE) — What’s Broken, How It’s Exploited, and How to Defend By CyberDudeBivash – Ruthless, Engineering-Grade Threat Intel
1) Executive Brief
Flowise, the popular open-source platform for building LLM agents, has faced a run of critical RCE-class vulnerabilities across 2024–2025. The newest wave includes pre-auth arbitrary file upload / file write leading to RCE, JS-injection-to-RCE, and an OS-command-execution path tied to “Custom MCPs” with minimal authentication (pre-3.0.1 often shipped with no auth enabled by default unless explicitly configured). Multiple issues carry CVSS ≈ 9.8. If your instance is exposed to the internet, treat as assume-breached until you validate configs, patch level, and logs. Pentest-Tools.comGitHubresearch.jfrog.comNVD
2) What’s actually vulnerable (attack primitives)
A) Arbitrary File Upload / Write → RCE
-
CVE-2025-26319 (≤ 2.2.6): pre-auth file upload via
/api/v1/attachments
; weaponize by planting web-reachable scripts/keys and pivoting to system execution. Pentest-Tools.comGitHub -
GHSA-8vvx-qvq9-5948: direct file write via
/api/v1/document-store/loader/process
enabling RCE (PoC overwritespackage.json
to gain execution). (Advisory initially noted no patched version.) GitHub+1
B) JS-Injection → RCE
-
CVE-2025-55346 (JFrog): critical “unintended dynamic code execution” enabling remote code execution by network attackers. research.jfrog.com
C) OS Command Execution via Custom MCPs
-
CVE-2025-8943 (NVD): design permits spinning up local MCP servers (e.g., via
npx
). With minimal/absent RBAC and pre-3.0.1 default w/out auth, an unauthenticated attacker can run unsandboxed OS commands. NVD
Earlier Flowise history includes CVE-2024-31621 (RCE in ≤1.6.2) and other unauthenticated issues, underscoring a persistent exposure theme. CVE Details
3) Attacker playbook (how it’s abused in the wild)
-
Recon/Targeting: Shodan/ZoomEye for public Flowise; look for default ports / banners.
-
Initial Access:
-
Pre-auth file upload or file write to drop payloads, SSH keys, or overwrite Node project files for code execution. Pentest-Tools.comGitHub
-
JS-injection path to achieve runtime execution. research.jfrog.com
-
MCP command exec path if auth is off or weak. NVD
-
-
Post-Exploitation: Harvest API credentials (OpenAI/LLM, vector DB keys), pivot to the host, establish persistence via systemd/PM2/npm scripts, and exfiltrate chat data/knowledge bases.
MITRE ATT&CK: T1190 (Exploit Public-Facing App), T1059 (Command/Scripting), T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer), T1005 (Data from Local System), T1041 (Exfil over C2).
4) Blue-Team Playbook (do this now)
A) Exposure & Version Audit
-
Inventory all Flowise endpoints; block external access until validated.
-
Record Flowise version; if ≤2.2.6 or <3.0.1, you likely carry pre-auth and no-auth-by-default risks—prioritize. Pentest-Tools.comNVD
B) Log & IOC Hunt
-
Web/API logs for:
-
POST /api/v1/attachments
(unexpected MIME/paths). Pentest-Tools.com -
POST /api/v1/document-store/loader/process
followed by odd file creations/package.json
changes. GitHub
-
-
Host artifacts: new files under Flowise working dir, unauthorized
npx
/node
invocations, PM2/systemd services created post-access. -
Credential theft: enumerate environment variables/configs for leaked LLM/vectorDB/API keys.
C) Emergency Containment
-
Quarantine public instances behind VPN/ZTNA; rotate all API keys, tokens, and any secrets exposed to flows.
-
If compromise suspected: re-deploy from clean images; verify integrity (hashes) of Flowise dir and dependencies.
5) Patching & Configuration (what “fixed” looks like)
-
Upgrade to the latest Flowise that remediates your tracked CVEs; for CVE-2025-8943, ensure ≥3.0.1 and require authentication (disable default-open posture). NVD
-
Track advisories for GHSA-8vvx-qvq9-5948 & CVE-2025-26319/CVE-2025-55346; several advisories initially shipped with no patched version—verify current maintainer guidance before production rollout. GitHubPentest-Tools.comresearch.jfrog.com
-
Enforce auth/RBAC for every environment (dev, staging, prod). Do not expose Flowise admin/API directly to the public internet. NVD
Hardening checklist
-
Reverse proxy + WAF with allow-listed routes; block file-write endpoints from untrusted IPs.
-
Run Flowise as non-root; read-only FS segments where possible; drop Linux capabilities; AppArmor/SELinux profiles.
-
Disable or tightly constrain Custom MCPs; require explicit allow-lists for any OS-level tooling. NVD
-
Validate upload types/size; store uploads outside the executable tree; sanitize paths; strip executable bit on write.
-
Secrets hygiene: vault the keys; avoid
.env
leakage; rotate on incident.
6) Security testing (DevSecOps)
-
Add DAST checks for
/api/v1/attachments
and/api/v1/document-store/loader/process
; fuzz for path traversal and content-type bypass. Pentest-Tools.comGitHub -
SCA/SBOM on the Flowise container; lock npm with
--omit=dev
and verified lockfiles. -
Pre-prod gates to assert auth required and MCP disabled unless business-approved.
7) Executive one-pager (copy/paste)
-
What: Multiple RCE-class vulnerabilities in Flowise (file upload/write, JS-injection, MCP command exec), some pre-auth and some default-no-auth pre-3.0.1. Many score CVSS 9.8. Pentest-Tools.comGitHubresearch.jfrog.comNVD
-
Risk: Full host compromise, theft of AI/LLM credentials & data, supply-chain pivot.
-
Action: Remove public exposure, patch/upgrade (≥3.0.1 for MCP auth baseline), force authentication/RBAC, hunt logs for upload/write abuses, rotate secrets. NVD
8) References (read these first)
-
CVE-2025-8943 (Custom MCPs → OS command exec; default no-auth pre-3.0.1). NVD
-
CVE-2025-55346 (JS-injection RCE; JFrog advisory). research.jfrog.com
-
CVE-2025-26319 (pre-auth arbitrary file upload ≤2.2.6). Pentest-Tools.com
-
GHSA-8vvx-qvq9-5948 (arbitrary file write → RCE, overwrite
package.json
). GitHub+1 -
CVE-2024-31621 (earlier RCE lineage). CVE Details
CyberDudeBivash Recommendations
-
CISOs: Treat Flowise as Tier-0 if it holds LLM keys/data; require ZTNA and RBAC before any exposure.
-
Blue Teams: Build a dashboard for version, auth mode, public exposure, and suspicious POSTs to upload/write endpoints.
-
Red/Purple: Emulate upload-to-exec and MCP command chains in a lab to validate WAF and EDR detections.
-
Builders: Make auth on by default, isolate uploads, and ship signed containers with secure defaults.
Powered by CyberDudeBivash — your daily dose of ruthless, engineering-grade threat intel.
#Flowise #RCE #GenAI #LLMSecurity #CVE #ZeroTrust #CyberDudeBivash
Comments
Post a Comment